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ABSTRACT
As healthcare data are pushed online, consumers have raised big concerns on the breach of their
personal information. Law and regulations have placed businesses and public organizations under
obligations to take actions to prevent such data breaches. Various vulnerabilities have been
identified in healthcare enterprise environments, in which the Wireless Body Area Networks
(WBAN) remains to be a major vulnerability, which can be easily taken advantage of by
determined adversaries. Thus, vulnerabilities of WBAN systems and the effective countermeasure
mechanisms to secure WBAN are urgently needed. In this research, first, the architecture of
WBAN system has been explored, and the vulnerabilities within the system have been identified
and analyzed. After that, issues on existing federal regulations related to WBAN are discussed.
Finally, scenarios are described where vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures are analyzed.
INTRODUCTION
The advances in Internet technologies, the
proliferation of mobile devices, and the
development of electronic healthcare records
have driven healthcare services online, and are
ubiquitous to provide convenience and
flexibility to users and patients (Johnson &
Willey, 2011; Tu, Spoa-Harty, and Xiao, 2015).
Wireless communication has played a critical
role in this process since it can provide
anytime and anywhere access, and the WBAN
(Wireless Body Area Network) has been
integrated into the healthcare environment in
the last two decades. WBAN has popular
applications in military, law enforcement, fire
departments, sports, and even hotels, due to
its extensive flexibility to monitor vital signs
such as blood pressure, glucose level, heart
rate, and body motion. An essential part of
WBAN is biomedical sensors, which are very
lightweight and small devices can be implanted
by a physician, or worn by the patients to
monitor and send the patients’ data to medical
personal (Patel, Park, Bonato, Chan, &
Rodgers, 2012).
However, due to the untrustworthy
internet environment, and especially the wide
adoption of wireless devices and technologies,
as well as sophisticated healthcare service and
business processes involved, healthcare sector
faces severe challenges on securing protected
healthcare information (El Emam et al., 2010;
Ernst & Young, 2011; Halbesleben, Wakefield,
and Wakefield, 2008; Johnson & Willey, 2011;
Tu, Xu, Butler, & Schwartz, 2012, Tu et al,
2015; Wakefield & Wakefield, 2008). Over the
past few years, millions of sensitive data
records in healthcare and other private and
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public sectors were exposed (Ernst & Young,
2011; Halbesleben, Wakefield, and Wakefield,
2008; Johnson & Willey, 2011; Ramzan, 2008;
RSA SECURITY, 2008; Wakefield &
Wakefield, 2008) and have resulted in
substantial financial and operational loss,
which greatly hurts the confidence of
customers, business partners, and stakeholders
(Ernst & Young, 2011; Hoffman, 2007,
Johnson & Willey, 2011; Seltxer, 2006). The
average total cost per data breach has risen to
$7.2 million or $214 per record lost (Ernst &
Young, 2011) and the estimated total cost of
data breach in healthcare industry is 6 billion
dollars annually (Johnson & Willey, 2011).
According to RSA's (RSA Security LLC)
annual Consumer Online Fraud Survey,
consumers are concerned, more than ever
before, about online private businesses and
public organizations putting their data at risk
(Hoffman, 2007). Meanwhile, over the last two
decades, government and industry bodies
around the world have issued many laws and
regulations such as HIPAA 1996, to ensure the
security, integrity, and confidentiality of
healthcare records, business data, and
healthcare IT infrastructures. These mandates
have placed businesses and organizations in
healthcare industry under obligations to
undertaken programs to ensure the compliance
with these laws and regulations; therefore,
securing protected healthcare information and
healthcare IT infrastructures, including the
wireless network infrastructure such as
WBANs, to prevent data loss including, data
breach and industrial espionage, is critical.
However, a few challenges exist and need
to be appropriately addressed. First, even
though the general theory of vulnerabilities
and threats of wireless networks may be well
understood, the specific knowledge of WBAN
system vulnerabilities and threats have been
remained unclear due to the complexity of the
WBAN system and the supported healthcare
business processes. Second, even though system
risk assessment methodology has been well
documented, security risks of WBAN systems
have not been formally studied due to the
relative insufficient effort on WBAN systems.
The objective of this research is to conduct
a systematic research on the security
management of WBAN systems in healthcare
enterprise environments. Specifically, a
systematic analysis of WBAN system
vulnerabilities and threats, risk assessment
involving WBAN system security risks, and
healthcare laws and regulations will be
conducted.
SYSTEM MODEL
An abstraction of classical healthcare
enterprise environment is modeled as a multi-
tier system that consists of multiple data
access or management parties, including a data
module, service providers, business users, data
management team, and client party. The
overview of the system is shown in Fig. 1.
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The data module is a central and critical
part of this architecture and is composed of a
data storage system, a data process module,
and a data access module. The data storage
module is essentially databases and files that
contain the information to be protected. The
data process module is composed of a
healthcare information system which processes
the information stored in the data storage
module for business clients, patients,
government agencies, and healthcare service
providers. The data access module is
essentially web-based interfaces for users. The
service provider party is composed of different
services that are provided by the healthcare
business, including hospital services, lab test
services, health prevention care services,
disease diagnosis and treatment services,
nursing, etc. These services involve many
human users such as doctors, technicians, and
nurses. The business party is essentially the
interactions between the healthcare business
entity and other entities such as other
healthcare service providers, government
agencies, insurance companies, healthcare
equipment/pharmacy providers. The data
management party is fundamentally the IT
teams including
database/web/network/computer system
administers, and the security/compliance team.
The client party is basically the patients and
their legal guardians.
Figure 1. An architecture overview of the healthcare enterprise system.
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A WBAN system is part of the
healthcare IT infrastructure and is composed
of three tiers. The first is composed of the
nodes that will transmit patients’ physiological
data to the second tier. The second tier is
mainly composed of a PS (Personal Server),
which will communicate with body sensors in
tier one through wireless personal network;
either Bluetooth or WiFi. The PS will not,
however, upload the gathered data until a
secure link becomes available. The third tier is
composed of the entities to whom the
information should be distributed, such as the
physician, nurses, emergency techs, the
caregiver, and medical servers. A medical
server stores electronic medical records for
registered users to provide services for
hundreds of users, including the informal
caregivers, medical personnel, and patients. It
is the personal obligation of the medical server
to authenticate its users, accept of the uploads
from health monitoring sessions, format and
insert data retrieved from the sessions in the
appropriate medical records, analyze of
different data patterns, and have the ability to
detect alarming health abnormalities to
provide contact to urgent care givers within
the area (Feng, 2008). The overview of the
abstractive architecture of the WBAN system
is illustrated in Fig. 2.
WBAN SECURITY
VULNERABILITY
ANALYSIS
Privacy and security are top concerns in
healthcare environment. Data stored,
transmitted, and processed in the healthcare
system can be corrupted, manipulated,
intercepted, and extracted. The loss of data,
hacking, extraction of data, patient
endangerment, and loss of money are just some
of the risks of the WBAN. These risks,
amongst others, can lead to future attacks if
ignored. WBAN systems, similar to other
forms of wireless networks, are more vulnerable
to Denial of Service and eavesdropping
Figure 2. An architecture overview of the WBAN
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compared to wired networks. Such
vulnerabilities can lead to serious safety
concerns because of the significant risk of
affecting overall performance, networks,
transmission of data, amongst others (Hugher,
Wang, & Chen, 2012). If the issues with the
security of the networks and WBAN systems
persist, it is in the hands of the provider to
make sure that all of the information is
confidential, available, and authentic.
WBAN Vulnerabilities & the
Impacts onConfidentiality
Ensuring confidentiality of patient data stored,
transmitted, and processed in WBANs are
crucial to healthcare vendors to be compliant
with laws and regulations such as HIPAA.
However, threats and attacks to breach
confidentiality of WBAN systems are common,
due to the nature of the wireless
communication in WBAN networks, the power
and CPU constraint of WBAN nodes, the
complexity of healthcare work flow, and non-
technical end users.
An adversary with a powerful antenna can
easily pick up data transmitted in the WBAN
networks, which contain physical location of
the patient, timestamps, source, and
destination addresses (Kumar & Lee, 2012).
Passive attacks are some of the most popular
attacks taken place during the process of
routing the data packets. The intruder can
manipulate the final destination of the packets
to enable the eavesdropping, and the data can
be stolen through the wireless communication
data and additionally pin-pointing the location
of the user (Ameen, Liu, & Kwak, 2012).
There have been plenty of cyber-attacks
throughout the years; many with the hopes of
compromising identities. If the attacks are
active, then they are much more harmful. Like
most cyber-attacks, the purpose is to steal
identities for malicious activities. When
medical records get involved, critical data is at
risk of being fully exposed and takes things to
another level. The healthcare providers and the
patients will suffer from that extraction of
data. It has been proven that a person with a
low-costing device can easily eavesdrop and
pick up on the data exchange of a pacemaker
(Picazo-Sanchez, Tapiador, Peris-Lopez, &
Suarez-Tangil, 2014, Kumar & Lee, 2012). The
extraction of the patients’ data will only
worsen any scenario. Following the theft of the
patient information, such information can
precede into impacting their personal lives
(Ameen, Liu, & Kwak, 2012).
WBAN Vulnerabilities & the
Impacts on Integrity
The devices in a WBAN system can be
compromised and the information can be
altered or processed by an unauthorized
attacker or in an unauthorized way (Picazo-
Sanchez, Tapiador, Peris-Lopez, & Suarez-
Tangil, 2014). An implantable cardioverter
defibrillator may experience unauthorized
alteration of information stored, transmitted,
or processed, including patient personal
information and health related data, as well as
the setting of therapy for when and how shocks
are administered. Such unauthorized alteration
can lead to the production of cardiac arrest, or
the reduction or increase of the amount of
insulin pumped, which can cause the patient to
die. The WBAN devices are also vulnerable
from people with malicious intent and from
natural causes such as wear and tear (Ameen,
Liu, & Kwak, 2012). The system may
malfunction, or processes flow may be changed
to produce unexpected results, which may pose
serious problems to the overall system
operation. Thus, it is extremely important to
design these devices to be tamper-proof.
WBAN Vulnerabilities & the
Impacts onAvailability
The availability of WBAN ensures that the
WBAN networks, devices, data, and services
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are always available to the authorized user in
authorized way when it is needed. An
adversary can break in a WBAN network and
capture or disable the Electrocardiogram
(ECG) node – which monitors electrical
activity of a patient’s heart. The loss of the
monitoring data of a patient’s heart behavior
could result in the loss of the patient’s life. A
WBAN network can be physically jammed by
injecting large amount of radio signals, or the
data link frame headers can be corrupted
which will lead to the discordance of the data
being transmitted. Spoofing is one of the most
common attacks against traffic routing. During
the spoofing attack, the intruder is capable of
causing complications within the networks by
manipulating the system into creating new
routing loops, and complicate overall process-
forwarding. The flooding then begins and
confuses the network into recognizing it as one
of its own nodes; granting it access without
being identified as being malicious, or
exhausting the memory to prevent the normal
WBAN communication (Saleem, Ullah, & Yoo,
2009). Moreover, a risk on the end of the
patient is blockage of localization. Dependent
upon the frequency that the wireless sensors
can communicate, the human body itself is
capable of causing blockage of all, or a select
few of the wireless signal required for
localization (Cornelius & Kotz, 2010). Such
vulnerability can result in a conflict when the
patient is in a life-or-death situation.  These
are just some of the examples of the risks
regarding the WBAN. There are many other
vulnerabilities that exist in WBAN systems,
for example, some vulnerabilities can result in
the loss of MRIs and X-ray images (Cornelius
& Kotz, 2010).
WBAN SYSTEM RISK
ANALYSIS
Safety precautions and regulations have been
established to further protect all identities and
information. Regulations have been well
established for the WBAN since WBAN has
been a popular technology for more than two
decades. Regarding to WBAN, the US FDA
(US Food and Drug Administration) has its
share in the regulation process, but FCC
(Federal Communications Commission) and
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act) played the bigger role in
regulating the WBAN and how it should
secure the data storage, transmission, and
processing. Any non-compliance of such
regulations could lead to financial and
reputational losses, and even lead to civil
litigations.
FCC Regulations
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Table 1
FCC regulations regarding WBANs.
The FCC  has concluded in their 2014
report that the “FCC will initially adopt a
‘permit but ask’ policy that is typically
associated with new technology, where devices
are required to be tested and approved directly
by the FCC test lab, which can be applied to
devices in WBAN systems. In addition to the
FCC approval, WBAN devices will also need
to receive FDA approval before they can be
used in hospitals” (Buckiewicz, 2015). These
regulations mainly deal with the technical
aspects of WBAN technology, such as device
certification, signal transmission, and
interferences. The availability assurance and
user access control falls in the scope of
cybersecurity. The WBAN restrictions and
compliances in accordance to the FCC is
shown in the following as Table 1.
HIPAA
In healthcare sector, one of the most important
regulatory criterion is HIPAA (Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability),
which was introduced in the year 1996. HIPAA
has established criterial and regulations on how
healthcare information should be handled such
that availability, integrity, and confidentiality
can be assured. Covered entities must put into
place critical protections for the ability to
protect every person’s healthcare information,
while also assuring that they don’t disclose or
misuse people’s health information. Also, these
same entities must train employees to protect
the information- all while rationally limiting
disclosure and use down to a minimum
necessity for accomplishment of intended
purposes (Federal Communications
Commission, 2013). The patients may also be
held accountable if they sign disclosure
agreements. Business Associates (including IT
personal and anyone with medical field
relations) additionally, are required to establish
safeguards to shield health information and
assurance of not disclosing healthcare
WBANs should only be used for the specifically for diagnostics and therapeutic devotions
WBANs should be provided to the patients but should be only  through the direction appropriately of a
verified  physician
WBANs are not allowed to provoke harmful interferences to other approved stations that operate
within the band of 2360-2400 MHz.
1
WBAN needs to accept interferences from any additional certified stations who are operating under
2360-2400 MHz
All WBAN devices must be made available for inspection upon request by an authorized
FCC representative.
As it is indicated in Part 95 rules, control or programmer WBAN transmitters need to be labeled with
statements. These statements provide the warning that the device should not be the cause of
interference and it has an obligation to accept interference from devices that are under the same
operation WBAN programmer/control transmitters. The statement can be placed in the manual of the
transmitter where it is not viable to placing the statements on the device itself.
WBAN controller/ programing transmitters need to be individually identified with the use of a serial
number that will be assigned by the manufacture of the specific device. The corresponding serial
number can be place on the device itself or place in the instructional manual of the transmitter.
( Federal Communications Commission, 2014).
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information improperly (U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, n.d.); however, even
a covered entity is capable of disclosing health
information that is supposed to be protected
for treatment (or other activities) when
another provider needs data to proceed with
procedures, which includes providers who are
not covered through the Privacy Rule (U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services,
2003). Failure to follow HIPAA regulations to
protect patient information could lead to a
financial penalty of 11,000 dollars, per
violation, per patient. In addition, in regards
to the security, since the establishment of
HIPAA, over 29 million records have been
wrongfully disclosed.
Table 2
Crucial WBAN security requirements, as been described in ( (Li, Lou, & Ren, 2010)).
All the measures and regulations are
established in hopes of further protection and
minimization of confiscation. The Officer for
Civil Rights on behalf of the HHS has stated
Critical Security
Requirements Description
Data Access
Access Control
A well-constructed data access policy will have to be enforced in order to prevent
any unauthorized parties from having the possibility of accessing any of the
patient data the WBAN generates.
Accountability A user who abuses the privilege to discharge any unauthorized acts regardingpatient data needs to be identified and be held liable for their actions
Non-repudiation Sources that generate patient related data can’t deny their origin
Revocability Privileges pertaining to WBAN user nodes ought to be deprived soon enough iffound guilty of malicious behavior or involved in compromising of data.
Data Storage
Confidentiality All data in relation to the patient must remain confidential throughout periods ofstorage.
Dependability The patient data must be willingly retrievable during data erasure or during nodefailure.
Dynamical
Integrity
Assurance
Throughout periods of storage, any patient related data may not be tempered
with. During the storage periods the data will be reviewed and can be identified
Other Important Requirements
Authentication The appointed patient related sender needs to be authenticated any addition ofdata outside the WBAN needs to be prohibited.
Availability Patient data needs to be accessible at all times even when it is under DoS attacks.
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“We hope the healthcare industry will take a
close look at this agreement and recognize that
OCR (US Office for Civil Right) is serious
about HIPAA enforcement. It is a covered
entity’s responsibility to protect its patients’
health information” (Wisniewski, 2011). Super-
confidential medical records containing drug
and alcohol, mental health, and HIV
information are subject to more stringent
federal and state laws under HIPAA. As a
result, physician practices must determine if
medical records contain super-confidential
information before releasing them. Generally, a
physician practice can release these super-
confidential records only upon a court order or
upon receipt of a HIPAA Authorization signed
by the patient which explicitly acknowledges
the records which contain drug and alcohol or
mental health record information (Medical
Records, n.d.).
Data security systems pertaining to
HIPAA are usually installed on computer
systems and networks of healthcare providers;
this also includes firewalls to further prevent
any wrongful access, and electronically-
inspecting systems are also used for individual
identification, logging, and specifying all
records each individual can access (Medical
Records, n.d.).  Additionally, transmitters in
the WBANs have to be certified by the FCC
or the Telecommunications Certification Body.
The certification processes consists of
submission of a certification application
followed by measurement reports
demonstrating compliance with FCC technical
requirements, or Telecommunications
Certification Body (Federal Communications
Commission, 2013). Moreover, more key
security requirements are included in HIPAA
and a partial list of such regulations are listed
in Table 2, which has been described in the
works by Li, Lou, and Ren (2010).
WBAN SECURITY
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
In this section, we will mainly describe three
generic healthcare workflow scenarios to
illustrate the potential security risks related to
the WBAN systems.
Scenario One
Let us assume that a patient Luna, who has a
life threatening heart disease and is currently
out of the US has a pacemaker, and notices a
change in cardiac rhythm which usually
indicates a danger to the patient with such a
disease. This is where the WBAN plays its
important role for communication between
patient and healthcare provider in a healthcare
application.  In this scenario (shown in Fig. 3),
the first response unit will identify Luna’s tag
in order to obtain her medical records and
existing information in the medical database.
Next, her vital signs will become available to
access for healthcare professionals, which can
speed up and enhance the treatment. With this
information now stored in the system, it will
instantly become accessible to anyone to
intervene and help. An intern, per se, has been
left in charge of monitoring all alarming
notifications for WBANs. The intern is now
able to upload a report from her WBAN to the
personal device that is transmitting the signal
in her area. Configurations are then made to
her network in order to configure who will be
able to have access to her WBAN. An
adaptation will soon take place and allow
several others to be able to operate her device
and access all her medical information.
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People who have access include: interns,
residents, nurses, IT department, and other
medical staff within the hospital. Luna herself
can also change her access policy and manage
who gains access to sensitive information. For
example, only a doctor could be able to see
drug abuse history and HIV history, where a
nurse may not have access to this sensitive
information. What is actually stored as
medical data is dependent on the nodes and
their storage capacity. The original data and
the update can be transferred to a wireless
network in the hospital; however, the data will
not be uploaded until a secure link is provided.
Luna’s WBAN and the local wireless server
will allow access to updated data to be
accessed rapidly and on-the-spot to help assist
her better.
The problem now is how to guarantee that
the information stored on nodes is not accessed
or modified by an unauthorized user and/or in
an unauthorized way. An adversary can take
advantage of various vulnerabilities in the
system to compromise a less secured node, and
can then manipulate the information in
transition within the WBAN system. This
could lead to the genuine information
unreachable to the medical staff, or the
pacemaker not to function as expected.
Therefore, all this information, as well as her
insurance and medical records, should all be
encrypted for storage and it is important to
keep this network as safe as possible.
Scenario Two
Activity and mobility of a patient should be
monitored and the results should be evaluated
and accessed in time, especially for those cases
that patient actions can lead to the risk of
falling. A sample scenario is illustrated in Fig.
4. In such a scenario, the communication
between patient and healthcare providers
through a wearable 3-axis accelerometer is
observed and data is analyzed offline since no
immediate action is required (Büsching,
Bottazzi, Pöttner, & Wolf, 2013). In this case,
it is desirable to acquire a dataset completed
without missing key data pertaining to the
overall length of the monitoring session.
However, radio transmission will not be
Figure 3. Overview of WBAN workflow including sensitive information in Scenario One
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possible if the patient leaves their home, since
the data will surpass the communication range
and become lost (Büsching, Bottazzi, Pöttner,
& Wolf, 2013). If the data gets lost or
corrupted and the patient suffers from a crisis,
the provider might not be become aware.
However, in real world, wireless
communication could suffer from malicious
attacks or unintentional interferences, which
could lead to denial of services and the
compromise data integrity. Without
appropriate protection, such attacks or
interferences could lead to the risk of loss of
life and health degradation for patients, and in
turn could result in financial loss and civil
litigation for service providers.
Scenario Three
It is always advised to ensure separate network
access control for volunteers, patients,
healthcare professionals, staffs, network
administrators, and other users. Strong
password and username combinations for user
authentication and accountability should be
enforced. In a typical hospital environment, as
illustrated in Scenario Three (as shown in Fig.
5), an open network is provided for patients
and guests to entertain themselves and relax
while they wait for assistance. A volunteer
should have a different access than an intern,
physician, and a resident. A normal person
waiting for assistance should not be able to
connect to the same network as a physician.
Open networks, as stated before, are perhaps
one of the most obvious, but neglected
vulnerabilities.
Figure 4. Offline and online monitoring
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Even though such wireless network is not
part of WBAN systems, it could lead to a data
breach or other risks to WBAN systems. The
wireless network is vulnerable to various
attacks, and users of wireless networks could
be also the same users using WBAN systems.
The compromise of the wireless network could
lead to the compromise of the WBAN system
and lead to the data breach and unauthorized
alteration in WBANs.
Discussion on Potential
Solutions
When encountering a disrupting a situation or
event, not every situation has a fundamental
solution that can be pinpointed easily. Just like
medical decisions, wireless security solutions
should be proposed confidentially and not
impulsively. As wireless communications
continue to expand daily, the struggle to keep
up with the security arises; the solutions that
are proposed to help the WBAN security
varies. The critical data that is encrypted is to
be used only for medical purpose, but once in
the wrong hands it can be fatal, and lead to a
costly loss on the practitioners’ side. One of
the proposed solutions for which security has
not been fully explored, and not quite
understood, is body-coupled communication. A
proposed requirement is extent proof that the
data comes from only one monitored body.
The reason being that some doctors may rely
on data collected from the WBAN for
procedures. It is critical to have assurance that
the data being analyzed is specifically collected
from that patient (Cornelius & Kotz, 2010).
Since the eavesdropper can access the personal
area network of the patients, it is proposed and
encouraged to encrypt the data with a
secretive private key which will only be shared
in a channel of secure communications that
will consist specifically between receiver and
the sender (Dr. Rangaraj, 2011). This
appointed key will have the capability to
decrypt and encrypt.  In order to further
prevent future flooding attacks, and the hacker
Figure 5. Guest connecting to open and shared network gaining access to sensitive information.
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falsifying information, all of the messages
should be required to be authenticated. The
authentication process would be able to help
prevent many incidents on all ends of a
WBAN. It can be viewed as going onto a site,
clicking “claim your prize,” entering your
personal information, being scammed, and
resulting with a virus. However, with an
appropriate anti-virus software installed, the
detection would be immediate and block the
transmission of data. Also, the wireless
networks used by medical professionals should
be restricted to certain group of users and not
made accessible to guests. However, this can be
a critical flaw in which that most places are
partaking and no appropriate access control
nor security protection in place. Currently, the
most popular proposal to enhance the safety of
WBANs is a cloud -based frame.
CONCLUSION
The healthcare field is now moving forward
and adapting the wireless to take full
advantage of the rapid advancement of
technology. The WBAN has been around for
over two decades and has been very popular in
the healthcare environment. Due to the
sensitivity of the information stored,
transmitted, and processed, security and
privacy have been the top concern; however,
the system is fundamentally flawed in security
and needs improvement as discussed in this
paper. Action to harden and secure the WBAN
system is therefore critically needed.
In this paper, we focus on addressing the
security management of WBAN systems in
healthcare enterprise environments. First, a
logic view of a typical healthcare enterprise
environment and WBAN system has been
described. WBAN security vulnerabilities were
discussed and identified. Second, the risks of
information security and privacy were assessed
and WBAN related regulations and standards,
e.g., FCC and HIPAA, have been discussed in
detail. Finally, healthcare scenarios involving
WBAN system have been illustrated to discuss
security vulnerabilities, risks, and
corresponding countermeasures.
The following research topics will be
further investigated in the future. First, a
comprehensive modeling should be developed
based on field experiences on a real world
healthcare enterprise environment with WBAN
system. Vulnerability identification,
attacks/threats enumeration, and financial and
regulatory risk analysis will be systematic
studied. A modeled enterprise healthcare
cyber-infrastructure design with appropriate
security and privacy controls will be developed.
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